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In the Western media Iran is regularly described as a land of 
abnormalities. The media’s representations of the country are for the 
most part stereotypical and regularly dishonest. The media regularly 
constructs caricatures of the country, exaggerating by means of often 
preposterous distortion, the politics and everyday reality of the country. 
When confronted with these representations of Iran, one is regularly 
reminded of Orientalism and the debates surrounding its critique. 
The term Orientalism describes the various schools of thought and 
methods of investigation through which Europe came to know ‘the 
East.’ According to critics of Orientalism, such as Edward Said, it 
was and still is through this discourse and its construction of 
knowledge that the ‘West’ has been able to legitimize and maintain 
its hold over the uncivilized ‘Eastern Other.’ The underlying thesis of 
all Orientalist analysis is that the Orient is primitive, mysterious, 
exotic, and incapable of self-government. However, Orientalism 
should not be seen merely as a post-hoc rationalization for colonial 
rule. Far more important is how it knowingly or unknowingly 
justifies imperialism and colonialism even in advance of their actual 
manifestations.
Attending to the ways Orientalism functions as a determinant 
discourse in the construction of knowledge allows critics to consider 
numerous ‘Western’ texts, from apparently separate intellectual 
disciplines such as politics, media, history, linguistics, and literature, 
among others, as belonging to a single discourse. What unites these 
texts together is the common culture and ideology intrinsic to the 
discursive practices through which they produce knowledge about the 
Orient. As Ania Loomba notes, these discursive practices thus “make 
it difficult for individuals to think outside them hence they are also 
seen as exercises of power and control.”1) However, it should be 
kept in mind that this does not mean that a discourse is static or 
cannot contain internal contradictions.
It is often the case that Orientalist modes of thought and 
representation are actually able to survive contact with the reality on 
the ground, even when their governing principles are at odds with 
this reality. One reason for this may be that the need to create an 
overall consistency in discourse may come before the goals of 
1) Ania Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism (London: Routledge, 1998), 39.
objective analysis and ‘truth’. The stronger the discourse becomes, the 
longer it lives and the better it is able to bring about consistency 
within its domain. This process is helped through the continued 
repetition and adaptation of the discourse’s central motifs. Another 
explanation for Orientalism’s persistence can be found through Said’s 
concept of latent and manifest Orientalism. Manifest Orientalism is 
comprised of openly stated ideas about Eastern civilization, history, 
government, and literature produced at different historical junctures. 
Latent Orientalism, however, is an “almost unconscious and certainly 
an untouchable positivity”2) that:
contains the basic ‘truths’ of the Orient, so that while, for example 
historians might disagree about particular interpretations of the history of the 
Orient, underlying assumptions of oriental backwardness would remain 
unquestioned. As such latent Orientalism has strong affinities with certain 
concepts of ideology, particularly the ‘negative’ version of ideology as false 
consciousness, and the durability of ideological formations, especially when 
allied to strong institutions such as Orientalism, would also help to explain 
the survival of Orientalist attitudes.3)
An important aspect of the critique of Orientalism is that it 
explains the methods through which ‘the Other’ was constructed by 
the West as its barbaric, irrational, despotic, and inferior opposite or 
alter ego. The ‘Other’ thus functions as a type of surrogate and 
underground version of the West or the ‘self.’ What may be even 
more significant, however, is that through its position of domination, 
2) Peter Childs and Patrick Williams, An Introduction to Post-Colonial Theory
(Essex: Prentice Hall, 1997), 101. 
3) Ibid., 101-102.
the West is even able to tell the ‘truth’ to non-Western cultures in 
this case Eastern cultures about their past and present conditions, as 
the West is capable of representing the Orient more authentically 
than the Orient can itself. Such a ‘truthful’ representation not only 
aids the colonizer or imperialist in justifying his actions, but also 
serves to weaken the resistance of ‘the Other’ by changing the way 
in which ‘the Other’ views itself. 
When one hears of the concept of representation in the media, the 
first thing that comes to mind is the idea of truthfulness. Some 
probably think an appropriate representation of an event in the media 
comes about when the presenter tells the truth. However, there are 
things other than telling or not telling the truth that make up the 
process of representation, especially when it comes to representing 
the Orient. The context in which a certain story is presented as well 
as the wording and the language of the story is also of importance 
when encountering representation. This is exactly where the power of 
the media lies. Hence, the problem is not merely whether or not the 
truth is told, but how the truth (or, as the case may be, non-truth) is 
told by the media. 
One element that helps explain this point is the role that 
simplification and emphasis play. When something happens 
somewhere in the world, different media outlets present it with 
emphasis put on different aspects of the event. In one media outlet 
only a shadow of the event is described, while in another the 
description is more colorful than the event was in reality. This is 
what we may call a distortion of the truth, whether intentional or 
not. Emphasizing certain elements of an event and deemphasizing 
other elements can often be in line with the interest of the owner or 
owners of a particular media outlet. That is one reason why different 
versions of “truth” are created or constructed to serve different 
interests and purposes.
The form of “truth” or distortion that is of concern here is an 
ideological one rather than a technical one; that is, one in which 
emphasis of any kind regularly backs a specific interest. The 
distortion may not always be intentional, because the expert or 
analyst, whatever his or her background, could have been trained 
under the illusion that knowledge and education are essentially neutral 
and are not tools that can also be used by contending centers of 
power, nations, or races. This can easily been seen in the discourse 
of the mainstream media in the ‘West’ and its support for Saddam 
Hussein’s brutal regime in the 1980s, even while the regime was 
using weapons of mass destruction against Iranian and Iraqi civilians 
and combatants. The same can be said about the western media’s 
relative silence and indifference towards the Israeli regime’s siege of 
the Gaza Strip and the atrocities committed there in the name of 
Zionism. Such crimes against humanity are regularly accepted as 
appalling yet somehow still necessary in order to protect the interests 
of the so-called Free World. 
The media’s treatment of Western governments, politicians, and 
other Western or Westernized figures of influence in comparison to 
that of their victims or antagonists, whether they are Iranian 
politicians, Afghani villagers, or Palestinian children, is regularly 
influenced by ‘national interests’ and the interests of the so called 
free world. In other words, the mainstream media takes for granted 
that Western actions are a necessary evil to ward off a greater evil. 
Hence, history and the present is told from the point of view of 
Western governments, conquerors, and diplomats, because they 
deserve universal acceptance in the face of the uncivilized Other.
The story of Iran’s presidential election was intensely covered in 
the websites of the three news outlets mentioned in this paper’s title 
and seems to be an appropriate example of Orientalism at play. From 
June 1 to July 18, CNN published 130 articles, The New York Times
142 articles, and The Washington Post 72 articles. This is an 
enormous number, a total of 344 articles and an average of more 
than 2 articles per day per website. However, in order to come up 
with a more in-depth review this paper covers the first 20 days of 
June, so as to include both pre-election and post-election events that 
took place in Iran. In this period of 20 days, a total of 152 articles 
were published on the CNN, Washington Post, and New York Times
websites together. 
A wide range of issues and events were focused upon in these 
websites but this paper discusses four main topics:
The candidates and their supporters
Speculations on the election before it was held
The election as rigged
Polls that predicted the election results
The Candidates and their Supporters
The way candidates and their supporters were described is 
interesting. However, as most of the attention was given to two of 
the candidates, here we only talk about these two candidates and 
overlook the other two. Obviously, the best person to start with is 
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The word that most often followed 
his name was “hard-liner” and his alleged failure in managing the 
Iranian economy was the topic that was emphasized. Throughout this 
period, these websites mention almost no positive aspect of Dr. 
Ahmadinejad’s leadership, whether domestic or foreign. The overall 
picture given was of a “hard-liner” who threatens the world with his 
alleged denial of the Holocaust, who insists on pursuing the Iranian 
nuclear program, and who had ruined the country with his 
“military-backed” government. He was regularly presented as having 
little support among religious scholars, clerics, the youth, women, and 
the educated. Hence, according to these news outlets, nearly all of 
the population was excluded from the list of his supporters. The only 
people these websites named as supporters of the President were the 
poor and those who lived in rural areas. Just like the term 
“hard-liner” that was widely used to describe the president, the word 
“poor” was often associated with his supporters. Below are a few 
examples of how Ahmadinejad’s supporters were described:
The Washington Post: A long column of provincial, working-class Iranians, 
clad in black and walking in flip-flops, streamed into a highway underpass, 
heading for a reelection rally for President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.4)
CNN’s website: But Ahmadinejad despite being blamed for Iran’s economic 
4) Thomas Erdbrink, “A Polarized Iran Prepares to Go to Polls,” Washington Post,
June 12, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/11/ 
AR2009061104106.html.
turmoil over the past four years maintains staunch support in rural areas.5)
The New York Times: Mr. Ahmadinejad has bought political support among 
the poor and lower middle class ”6)
Mr. Mousavi and his supporters, however, were described very 
differently.7) Unlike with Ahmadinejad, a very positive picture of 
Mousavi was regularly presented. Some of the key words that 
described him in the articles were: reformist, intellectual, calm and 
mild, a “lovely architect,” and (in an op-ed) “the anti-Ahmadinejad.”8)
In many instances, he was also praised for handling Iran’s economy 
during most of the 8 years of war. This is interesting because during 
the Iran-Iraq war Mr. Mousavi was himself presented as a 
“hard-liner” by the western media. One of the many positive images 
of Mr. Mousavi comes from The Washington Post, which published 
an article by Thomas Erdbrink claiming, “Those close to Mousavi, 
who is also an architect, describe a worldly intellectual who is not 
hungry for power but who thinks that Iran’s bad economy and 
international isolation require him to try to effect change.”9) Neil 
MacFarquhar, in an article published in The New York Times on June 
5) “Ahmadinejad hails election as protests grow,” CNNwebsite, June 13, 2009, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/06/13/iran.election/index.html.
6) Robert Worth, “As Iran Gets Ready to Vote, Economy Dominates,” The New 
York Times, June 10, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/10/world/ middleeast/ 
10iran.html.
7) Mousavi is spelled either as Mousavi or Moussavi. I have used the former 
throughout, but have preserved the latter spelling when it appears as such in a 
quoted news article.
8) Roger Cohen, “Iran Awakens Yet Again,” The New York Times, June 11, 2009, 
www.nytimes.com/2009/06/11/opinion/11iht-edcohen.html.
9) Thomas Erdbrink, “A Polarized Iran.”
17, quotes Gary Sick, who for years worked in the U.S. National 
Security Council, as saying, “Mousavi was around in some tough 
times, he has not shown any signs of being intimidated by all this.”10)
Even in articles where his previous background as a “hard-line 
revolutionary” is discussed, the authors emphasize that he is no 
longer a revolutionary or a hard-liner; but rather that he has turned 
into “a pragmatic manager.”11)
It was not only the candidate himself who was portrayed by these 
media outlets in such a positive light, but his wife too was regularly 
praised. She was admired for “sporting a floral hijab that taunted 
grey-black officialdom”12) and for being “a prominent academic,”13)
or “a much-admired academic.”14) In addition to Mousavi and his 
wife, his supporters are also represented positively. They are the 
educated, the young, the better-off, and the female; thus suggesting 
that nearly everyone but the poor supports him in Iran. Below are a 
number of other examples depicting the way Mr. Mousavi and his 
supporters were constructed:
The New York Times: Mr. Moussavi, a former prime minister with a 
reputation for honesty and competence, has emerged as Mr. Ahmadinejad’s 
10) NeilMacFarquhar, “Iran’s Latest Protests Seen as the Toughest to Stop,” The 
New York Times, June 17, 2009, www.nytimes.com/2009/06/17/world/middleeast/ 
17tehran.html.
11) Erdbrink, “A Polarized Iran Prepares to Go to Polls.”
12) Cohen, “Iran Awakens Yet Again.”
13) Thomas Erdbrink, “Iranian Leader, Rival Express Sharply Divergent Views in 
Debate,” The Washington Post, June 4, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/ 03/AR2009060301359.html.
14) MoniBasu, “Women in Iran march against discrimination,” CNN website, June 19, 
2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/06/19/iran.protests.women/ index.html.
strongest challenger. In recent weeks his campaign has gained tremendous 
energy, and huge rallies by his supporters have packed the streets of the 
capital day and night.15)
The New York Times: The world has watched as voters in the streets of 
Tehran rallied for the reformist candidate, Mir Hussein Moussavi, demanding 
“a government of hope.”16)
The Washington Post: Mousavi’s political foot soldiers, in turn, are 
disgruntled middle-class youths, intellectuals, artists and academics who have 
been alienated by the current government’s radical rhetoric and pervasive 
restrictions on personal freedom, such as police controls on the way people 
dress, the banning of books and the disciplining of dissident students.17)
The Washington Post: But he entered the race on a main promise to stand 
up to Ahmadinejad, which has earned him the support of influential clerics, 
politicians and young people alike.18)
Speculations on the Election Before it was Held
In many of the articles, speculation on the results of the election 
can be found. Although in the early days of coverage, articles on all 
three websites had admitted the existence of large support for the 
president, as the election neared, newer articles reported that the 
supporters of Mr. Mousavi had increased dramatically. A good 
15) Robert Worth, “In Iran Race, Ex-Leader Works to Oust President.” The New 
York Times. June 11, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/11/world/middleeast/ 
11iran.html.
16) CameliaEntekhabifard, “Tehran’s Eternal Youth,” The New York Times, June 
12, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/12/opinion/12entekhabifard.html.
17) Erdbrink, “A Polarized Iran Prepares to Go to Polls.” 
18) ThomasErdbrink, “A Relative Unknown Leads Challenge in Iran,” The 
Washington Post, June 8, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2009/06/07 /AR2009060702542.html.
example can be found in an article by Robert Worth for The New 
York Times, published on June 12, in which the atmosphere of voting 
on the day of the election is described:
Less than two months ago, it was widely assumed here and in the West 
that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran’s hard-line president, would coast to 
another victory in the elections on Friday. Many of the reformists who sat 
out the vote in 2005 seemed dejected and unlikely to raise a strong 
challenge. As voters went to the polls Friday, that picture has been 
transformed. A vast opposition movement has arisen, flooding the streets of 
Iran’s major cities with cheering, green-clad supporters of Mir Hussein 
Moussavi.19)
A Washington Post article, written by Erdbrink and William Branigin 
and published on June 12, tells the story from a similar viewpoint: 
“Long lines formed at the polls Friday in Tehran’s uptown, more 
cosmopolitan neighborhoods, believed to be strongholds for Mousavi. 
In the city’s poorer areas, where Ahmadinejad has deeper support, 
lines were much shorter.”20) Regardless of whether lines in “the 
city’s poorer areas” were really shorter or not, CNN follows the 
same trend in an article, written by Ashly Fantz, titled ‘Moussavi: 
Painter, Architect and Possibly Iran’s Next President,’ which was 
published one day before the election and describes a situation that 
favors Mr. Mousavi; the article expressly claims that he had a greater 
19) Robert Worth, “As Iran Votes, Talk of a Sea Change,” The New York Times,
June 12, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/12/world/middleeast/12iran.html.
20) Thomas Erdbrink and William Branigin, “Ahmadinejad, Opponent Claim Election 
Victory in Iran,” The Washington Post, June 12, 2009, http://www.redcafe.net/ 
f13/iranians-go-polls-253972/.
chance of winning the election than he did previously.21) The overall 
picture that was being presented for the readers of the websites was 
a situation that would lead to only one expected result: the victory of 
Mr. Mir Hossein Mousavi. 
Representing the Election as Rigged
When the election ended, the three news outlets reported adamantly 
that the election was rigged. In June 15, CNN put “Q & A: Was the 
Iranian election rigged?” an article consisting of questions posed to 
two analysts, on its website. In a part of this article, one of the 
analysts Amir Taheri, who was an influential pro-Shah journalist 
before the Revolution and is now based in Europe claims that: 
“Many voters are illiterate and officials help them fill in their ballot 
papers, so the possibilities for rigging are immense.”22) This is an 
extraordinary claim, because for over three decades and after the 
Islamic Revolution, universal education has been implemented and, 
unlike during the Shah’s reign, today almost all males and females 
under the age of thirty are literate. 
The same analyst, when answering the question, “So is it possible 
that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad did win the election?” answers, “I’m 
sure he did win the election but it’s impossible he won 63 percent 
21) Ashly Fantz, “Moussavi: Painter, architect and possibly Iran’s next president,” CNN 
website, June 11, 2009, http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/06/11/iran.moussavi. 
profile/index.html.
22) “Q &A: Was the Iranian election rigged?” CNN.com, June 15, 2009, http:// 
edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/06/15/iran.elections.qa/index.html.
of the vote. The results probably exaggerated the scale of his 
support.”23) However, he provides no evidence to back up this claim. 
The other analyst who was asked to provide an answer to the same 
question was Karim Sadjadpour. He also claims that “There are a lot 
of signs there were major improprieties. First of all there were 40 
million votes cast and just two hours after the polls had closed they 
announced Ahmadinejad’s victory: and these votes are hand counted 
in Iran ”24) This claim, which is false, is dealt with along with 
many others in a series of articles written in English by former US 
National Security Council staff members Flynt and Hillary Mann 
Leverett25) as well as in two detailed articles on the election results, 
the first by Reza Esfandiari and Yousaf Bozorgmehr26) and the 
second by Eric A. Brill.27) However, as all three of the news outlets 
in question here had reporters in Tehran during the elections, one 
would expect that their reporters would know these claims are false.
Other evidence of fraud suggested by Sadjadpour is “that Mousavi, 
who is an ethnic Azeri Turk, lost the province of Iranian 
Azerbaijan.”28) While Glen Kessler and Jon Cohen did point out in 
The Washington Post that “Native sons do not always prevail, of 
course. Vice President Al Gore lost Tennessee, his home state, in the 






28) “Q &A: Was the Iranian election rigged?” CNN website, June 15, 2009, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/06/15/iran.elections.qa/index.html.
29) Glenn Kesslerand Jon Cohen, “Signs of Fraud Abound, But Not Hard Evidence,” 
process in Iran was beset by fraud. None of the articles mention that 
President Ahmadinejad was a former governor in one of the key 
Azeri provinces and that he is a fluent Azeri speaker. 
Interestingly, three polls were conducted inside Iran by western 
organizations during the election period in addition to a number of 
polls conducted by the University of Tehran. All of these polls 
suggested that Ahmadinejad would win a strong majority of the votes 
throughout the country.30)
On June 15-reporters Worth and Nazila Fathi reported for The New 
York Times that the “state news agency announced that Mr. 
Ahmadinejad had won by a vast margin just two hours after the 
polls closed. The timing alone provoked deep suspicion here, because 
the authorities have never before announced election results until the 
following morning.” In the same article, the writers quote an 
unnamed supporter of President Ahmadinejad who suggested “There 
might be some manipulation in what the government has done but 
the other side is exaggerating, making it seem worse than it really is.”31)
By quoting an unnamed supporter of Ahmadinejad, not only does the 
article present itself as balanced and objective but also the whole 
notion of fraud is presented as something accepted by all sides. The 
alleged “deep suspicion” over timing and vote count is mentioned in 
The Washington Post as well. In the article “What Do Iranians 
The Washington Post, June 16, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ 
content/article /2009/06/15/AR2009061503235.html.
30) http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/652.php.
31) Robert Worthand Nazila Fathi, “Ahmadinejad, Rejecting Strife, Hints of Arrests,” 
The New York Times, June 15, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/15/ 
world/middleeast/15webiran.html?scp=1&sq=%22Ahmadinejad,%20Rejecting%20St
rife, %20Hints%20of%20Arrests%22&st=cse.
Want,” written by Jeffrey Gedmin and published on June 16, it is 
reported that “The government began announcing results before the 
votes could have been properly counted.”32) The doubt and suspicion 
that these words spread is so clear that it requires no explanation- 
except for the fact that this claim was not true and that the election 
results came out only gradually.
The June 18 New York Times editorial, “Iran’s Non-republic,”
again emphasized the early vote count as a proof of fraud: 
“Government authorities bulldoze the results of last week’s presidential 
election declaring the incumbent, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the winner 
by a landslide before the votes could be credibly counted.”33)
The significant point here is that no published article by these 
three media outlets questions how Mr. Mousavi declared himself the 
winner before the polls closed. No article on these sites asks how he 
had been able to count the votes in no time. Below is the story of 
victory claims made in The Washington Post on June 12:
In a news conference held before the balloting was completed, former prime 
minister Mir Hossein Mousavi, the main challenger of President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad, claimed a decisive victory. But minutes later, the official 
Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) announced that Ahmadinejad had 
won reelection. 
“In line with the information we have received, I am the winner of this 
election by a substantial margin,” Mousavi, 67, declared. An aide said the 
32) Jeffrey Gedmin, “What Do Iranians Want?” The Washington Post, June 15, 2009, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/15/AR2009061502399. 
html.
33) “Iran’s Non-republic,” The New York Times, June 18, 2009, http://www.nytimes. 
com/2009/06/18/opinion/18thu2.html.
moderate candidate had won 65 percent of the vote.34)
Mr. Mousavi’s claim of victory is not really questioned and it raises 
no suspicion or question, especially as he is repeatedly portrayed as a 
pro-Western and thus “moderate candidate.” In addition, even before 
the election ended, an article in The Washington Post, written by 
Erdbrink, quoted Morteza Alviri, Karroubi’s representative on the 
committee as saying, “We will have our results before the Ministry 
of Interior does.”35) Here again the three news outlets analyzed here 
demonstrate no skepticism or disbelief in response to the numerous 
claims made by Ahmadinejad’s opponents. 
The Polls that Predicted the Results
There are three groups of polls: the polls allegedly conducted by 
the opponents to the Iranian president, polls conducted by foreign 
organizations in Iran, and polls carried out by Iranian academic and 
research institutes. The reaction to these polls were very interesting. 
The first group (if they actually existed) was presented to be more 
reliable than the others:
The New York Times: [A] new unofficial poll suggests his support has 
markedly increased, with 54 percent of respondents saying they would vote 
for him compared with 39 percent for Mr. Ahmadinejad.36)
34) Thomas Erdbrink and William Branigin, “Ahmadinejad, Opponent Claim Election 
Victory.”
35) Erdbrink, “A Polarized Iran Prepares to Go to Polls.”
36) Robert Worth, “In Iran, Harsh Talk as Election Nears,” The New York Times,
The New York Times: The university’s campaign team has developed its own 
software for doing election polls, and has given 1,000 phones equipped with 
it to campaign workers who fan out across the country to do face-to-face 
questionnaires. They type the answers directly into the phones, and then 
transmit them back to the Tehran headquarters by text message, Mr. 
Rafsanjani [the son] said. The surveys are being done almost continuously, 
and the latest show Mr. Moussavi with at least 56 percent of the vote, 
compared with a maximum of 42 percent for Mr. Ahmadinejad, he said”37)
CNN website: All the polls and all the predictions were saying that 
Moussavi was going to win, and Ahmadinejad won with such a landslide, 
which was something that no one even thought about,” Bandari [a University 
of California student] said. “Even Ahmadinejad supporters didn’t think about 
that. And then the way that they gave out the news was very fishy.”38)
The New York Times: The landslide victory for Mr. Ahmadinejad, an 
intensely divisive figure here and abroad, came as a powerful shock to 
opposition supporters, who had cited polls showing that Mr. Moussavi had a 
strong lead in the final days of the campaign.39)
As these examples show, articles on these websites regularly spoke of 
numerous polls (“All the polls ”) that had predicted the victory of 
Mir Hosssein Mousavi but they never gave any specific information 
about the supposed polls. In fact, to date there is no evidence that 
any meaningful polls were carried out by Mousavi supporters; after 
the elections such claims were not repeated. In fact, only one known 
poll was carried out by a research institute that was headed by a 
June 8, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/08/world/middleeast/08iran.html?scp 
=1&sq=%22In%20I ran , %20Harsh%20Tal k%20as%20El ec t i on% 
20Nears%22&st=cse.
37) Worth, “In Iran Race, Ex-Leader Works.”
38) “Clashes in Iran reveal deep divide,” CNN website, June 14, 2009, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/06/14/iran.protests.scene/index.html.
39) Worth and Fathi, “Rejecting Strife.”
Mousavi supporter. The Jahade Daneshgahi polling center (ISPA) did 
not release the results of the poll which was carried out near 
Election Day. In fact, the results were leaked by some of the people 
who were involved with the polling a few weeks after the election 
and they showed Ahmadinejad to be well ahead of his rivals. ISPA 
never denied the authenticity of the leaked results. 
Nevertheless, the way these websites represented the polls that 
predicted Ahmadinejad as the winner was very different. These polls 
were often referred to with suspicion and reporters for the three news 
providers were clearly attempting to undermine them even though 
they were carried out by American institutes:
CNN Website: [In response to Ken Bellen on a poll that predicted a 
massive victory for Ahmadinejad] “That does not mean that he would have 
won the election, and we never said he would,” Ballen told CNN’s 
“Newsroom” on Tuesday. “Many people think there was a late surge for 
Moussavi, and our poll does not reflect that.”40)
CNN Website: “The assumption that the government has rigged the election 
has become a ‘social fact’ that millions of Iranians believe.”41)
The New York Times: [The speaker quoted is Shane M, a student in Iran ] 
Let’s also forget the polls, carried out in May by Terror Free Tomorrow: The 
Center for Public Opinion, that have been making the rounds this past week, 
with numbers that showed Mr. Ahmadinejad well ahead in the election, even 
in Mr. Moussavi’s hometown, Tabriz. Maybe last month Mr. Ahmadinejad 
was indeed on his way to victory. But then came the debates.42)
40) MattSmith, “Analysts pore over ‘ambiguous’ Iran results,” CNN website, June 16, 
2009, http://articles.cnn.com/2009-06-16/world/iran.election.questions_1_sampling-error- 
president-mahmoud-ahmadinejad-poll?_s=PM:WORLD.
41) HamidDabbashi, “Rigged or Not, Vote Fractures Iran,” CNN Website, June 16, 
2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/06/17/dabashi. iran.regime/index.html.
The examples clearly show how articles published by these news 
providers tried to degrade the importance and validity of the polls 
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Orientalist Representations and the 2009 Iranian 
Presidential Election: The New York Times, 
The Washington Post, and CNN.com
The 2009 presidential election in the Islamic Republic of Iran, which 
resulted in a landslide victory for the incumbent President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad, was extensively covered by the Western media. Three leading 
American news providers presented the two main presidential candidates very 
differently. One was portrayed as enlightened and moderate, while the other 
was depicted as crude and irrational. While in the United States it is widely 
believed that the media is relatively credible in the way it presents the news, 
critics often believe that the U.S. media is Orientalist in the way it 
approaches non-Western countries and especially Muslim countries. According 
to critics, countries that are politically at odds with the United States, such 
as Iran, are presented in an almost completely negative light. In this article, 
election coverage from the New York Times, The Washington Post, as well 
as the CNN website is analyzed to determine the approach these news 
agencies took to the presidential election as well as the degree to which they 
stuck to the facts on the ground. The paper concludes that all three media 
outlets were highly biased in their coverage and that they regularly dismissed 
or ignored facts while repeatedly making claims that were unsubstantiated. 
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